Research
My research focuses on various issues in contemporary and historical metaphysics and philosophy of mind, and I often approach these areas by employing resources that can be found in thinkers such as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, as well as a number of philosophers in the Neoplatonic and phenomenological traditions. In a current book project, for example, I address our ability to achieve mutual awareness with other persons, suggesting that we can make progress in explaining this phenomenon by utilizing a Thomistic powers ontology and philosophical anthropology. In other current projects I discuss the importance of social interactions for theories of personhood, the nature of certain social relations (e.g., the second-person, the first-person plural), the ontology of the powers operative in acts of human cognition, and the role of shared mental states in collective agency. I am also interested in a number of topics in historical philosophy, including Aristotle’s hylomorphism, Neoplatonic theories of being and intelligibility, and Thomas Aquinas’s theory of cognition.
Below are listed a selection of published papers, presentations, and works in progress. For a complete list, please see my CV.
Published papers
"Social Interactions, Aristotelian Powers, and the Ontology of the I-You Relation," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 75(1), 2021: 91-113.
Abstract: Much of the discussion on the second-person has focused on the character of second-person thought, with many arguing that “you thoughts” are intrinsically reciprocal and thus can only be achieved when at least two persons simultaneously think of each other second-personally. Yet while the character of second-person thought is important, the ontology of the second-person relation has been largely overlooked, but an ontological analysis of this relation uncovers resources that help to advance our understanding of what makes the second-person unique. In this paper I outline competing positions regarding the character of second-person thought, and then utilize an Aristotelian powers ontology to raise challenges for the claim that second-person thoughts are intrinsically reciprocal. However, I then employ this ontological framework to highlight the bidirectional and dynamic nature of the I-You relation, which in turn reveals a unique form of personal interdependence within this relation. Thus, independently of the character of second-person thought, this ontological approach supports the position that the second-person interaction necessarily involves reciprocation.
“The Illuminative Function of the Agent Intellect,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Vol. 27(1), 2019: 3-22.
Abstract: Thomas Aquinas argues that the agent intellect’s function is to abstract an intelligible species from a phantasm. However, insofar as he claims that the intelligible species is not present in the phantasm, it is unclear how the agent intellect accomplishes this task. In this paper I explore two models of abstraction – the extraction model and the production model – suggesting that each fails to capture Aquinas’ account. I then offer my own interpretation of the function of the agent intellect – the illumination model – by employing Aquinas’ comparison of the agent intellect to light. I argue that the agent intellect neither extracts nor produces an intelligible species, but rather makes the nature that is already present in the object intelligible by actualizing its passive power of intelligibility. This involves the co-actualization of partner powers in the intellect and in the intelligible object, and ultimately makes it possible to cognize a particular, material object in a universal way.
“The Unity of the Knower and the Known: The Phenomenology of Aristotle and the Metaphysics of Husserl,” Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, Vol. 22(2), Spring 2018: 293-313.
Abstract: Aristotle famously asserted that the mind is identical with its object in an act of cognition. This “identity doctrine” has caused much confusion and controversy, with many seeking to avoid a literal interpretation in favor of one that suggests that “identity” refers to a formal isomorphism between the mind and its object. However, in this paper I suggest that Aristotle’s identity doctrine is not an epistemological claim about an isomorphism between a representation of an object and the object itself, but is a phenomenological claim about the character of human cognition and intelligible being. Drawing on texts from Edmund Husserl and Aristotle, I offer a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s identity doctrine. I ultimately argue that, for Aristotle, mind and being are essentially unified, for intelligible being is partially constitutive of the mind.
Presentations
“True Love is Reciprocal: Thomas Aquinas on the Love of Friendship.” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting, Virtual Meeting, April 6, 2021.
“There Is an I in You (and a You in I): A Buberian Account of Personhood.” Society of Christian Philosophers, Mountain-Pacific Division Meeting, College of Southern Nevada, Las Vegas, Nevada, April 6, 2019.
“Becoming Oneself Through Another: A Relational Ontology of Persons.” American Catholic Philosophical Association, Panel Discussion on “Thomistic Flourishing: A Second-Person Approach,” with Matthew Shea and Andrew Pinsent, University of San Diego, November 11, 2018.
“Acting Together: The Co-Constituted Nature of Shared Agency.” Northern New England Philosophy Association Annual Meeting, Plenary Session, University of Vermont, October 27, 2018. Commentary from Michael Bratman.
“Revisiting the Substance-Artifact Distinction: Or, Why Aristotle Went Organic Before It Was Cool.” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting, San Diego, California, March 29, 2018.
“Joint Attention, Symmetrical Sharing, and the First-Person Plural.” American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, February 23, 2018
“Social Interactions, Aristotelian Powers, and the Ontology of the I-You Relation.” American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division Meeting, Savannah, Georgia, January 5, 2018.
“Me and You, and You and Me: How a Powers Ontology Clarifies the Second-Person Relation (and Makes us ‘So Happy Together’).” Copenhagen Summer School in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, August 14, 2017. Commentary from Soren Overgaard.
“‘Got to Get You into My Life’: A Case for Primitive Second-Person Thoughts.” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting, Seattle, Washington, April 12, 2017.
“The Illuminative Function of the Agent Intellect.” American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meeting, Kansas City, Missouri, March 3, 2017.
“The Phenomenology of the I-You Relation,” with Jeffrey Bishop. Philosophical Collaborations Conference, Southern Illinois University – Carbondale, Illinois, February 24, 2017.
“Thomistic Mindreading: Why We Ought To Reconsider Aquinas’ Theory of Cognition.” American Catholic Philosophical Association, 90th Meeting, ACPA Sponsored Satellite Session, Boston College, Massachusetts, October 11, 2015.
“Forgiveness Then Satisfaction: Why the Order Matters for a Theory of The Atonement.” The Society of Christian Philosophers, Eastern Regional Meeting, Messiah College, Pennsylvania, September 25, 2015.
“The Unity of the Knower and the Known: The Phenomenology of Aristotle and the Metaphysics of Husserl.” Ancient Philosophy Society Conference, University of San Francisco, April 22, 2012.